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Business-to-Business Internet Purchasing Exchanges:
The Promises and Antitrust Risks of a New e-Commerce
Platform
Garen Gotfredson
INTRODUCTION
Ever since the emergence of the World Wide Web less than
a decade ago, the Internet has been hailed as a technological
1
innovation that held the potential to transform our society.
The recent economic slowdown and the accompanying fall off of
the stock markets, however, have severely dampened
enthusiasm for firms focused on developing Internet
2
applications. Regardless of the fate of any individual Internet
company, however, the Internet itself appears here to stay, and
in the past few years a new Internet platform has emerged
which allows multiple businesses to easily engage in commerce
with each other in real time. The importance of these
1. See Jane Katz, Business-To-Business Use of the Internet is Slowly
Transforming the Economy. But there is No Frictionless Transition, REGIONAL
REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF BOSTON 2, (September 19, 2000)
(“To the army of geeks and programmers who were [the Internet’s] early
proponents, the new open technology seemed to offer limitless possibilitiesborderless free markets, a close-to-costless way of making transactions, and a
fluid and effortless medium for collaboration.”).
2. At least 210 Internet companies shuttered their doors in the year
2000, and nearly 60% of the failures occurred in the fourth quarter of that
year.
See Carol Sliwa, Facing Tough Rivals, eToys Nears Oblivion,
COMPUTERWORLD 1 (January 8, 2000) <http://www.computerworld.com/cwi/
story/0,1199,NAV65-665_STO55934,00.html>.
Observing the demise of
dot.coms has become something of a sport, with sections of some web sites
devoted to the task.
See e.g., Upside (visited June 16, 2001)
<http://www.upside.com/graveyard/>.
Each failed dot.com listed is
accompanied by a quote from the firm, often taken from the defunct company’s
web site. See id. Some of the more interesting comments include: “[s]ince
we’re all seeking challenging new opportunities, please check out the resumes
of our company’s talented employees.” See TheMan (visited June 16, 2001)
<http://www.theman.com>. “Rome fell. Napoleon was defeated at Waterloo.
Knight Rider was pulled off the air. Things end.” See Free Scholarships
(visited June 16, 2001) <http://www.freescholarships.com> (message posted in
an attempt to explain its demise).
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transactions, known in the trade as Business-to-Business, or
B2B, transactions, may eventually come to dwarf the impact
3
that the Internet has had on consumers.
In spite of the promises inherent in this new business
model, B2B exchanges necessarily involve collaboration
between competitors in a market, and thus raise potential
antitrust concerns. Because of the infancy of the B2B exchange
model, little antitrust attention has been paid to these entities
until recently.
This Note proposes that the FTC exercise great caution in
its approach to the regulation of B2B exchanges, but
recommends that some additional steps be taken to ensure that
these exchanges do not become a center of anticompetitive
pricing behavior. Part I examines in some detail the design
and benefits of the B2B business model. Part II lays out the
FTC’s traditional framework in analyzing antitrust issues
involving collaborations among competitors, of which B2B
exchanges form a subset. Part III critiques the FTC’s response
to the antitrust issues raised by B2B exchanges and
recommends that these exchanges be required to take steps to
protect the confidentiality of data concerning buyers, sellers,
and prices on the exchange.
I. THE PROMISES OF B2B INTERNET EXCHANGES
A B2B electronic marketplace (exchange) consists
essentially of a software package which enables buyers and
sellers of one or more goods to transact with each other through
4
the Internet. It is estimated that the total value of B2B ecommerce will be $7.29 trillion dollars by 2004, of which 37%
5
will consist of transactions taking place on B2B exchanges.
3. Business purchases of goods and services amount to over 70% of the
total sales in the economy. See Katz, supra note 1, at 1 (citing Princeton
economist Alan Blinder). The change in the structure of the economy caused
by the emergence of business-to-business commerce, therefore, may far exceed
the changes wrought by the purchase of goods over the Internet by consumers.
See id.
4. See Donald S. Clark, Notice of the Federal Trade Commission
Announcing the Public Workshop on Competition Policy in the World of B2B
Electronic Marketplaces (visited Apr. 9, 2001) <http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/05/
b2workshop.htm>.
5. See Comments Regarding B2B Electronic Marketplaces, Memorandum
from Arthur B. Sculley & W. William A. Woods to the Federal Trade
Commission Public Workshop on Competition Policy in the World of B2B
Electronic Marketplaces. Estimates of the current value of B2B sales in the
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Since B2B electronic exchanges are a relatively recent
innovation, the various business models utilized by the
exchanges remain in rapid evolution. The exchanges may be
grouped into three main types, however. The first and earliest
model, and the most common overall, is the independent
vertical exchange, in which an independent third party forms
the exchange and brings buyers and sellers of certain goods
6
within a specific industry together. The second type, and most
popular model, is the buyer vertical exchange, in which the
7
exchange is formed by a group of buyers in a given industry. A
third type, designated as the horizontal model, is not limited to
firms of any particular industry; rather, it seeks to serve any
8
business that purchases or sells a given category of goods.
Regardless of which model a given B2B exchange
represents, a variety of methods may be used to match orders
between buyers and sellers. A catalog system may consist of
nothing more than the online grouping together of the sale
catalogs of a number of suppliers in a given industry, for
9
example auto parts. Such an arrangement allows a buyer, for
example, an automaker, which is a member of the exchange, to
quickly compare prices and other variables for a desired auto
part among the different suppliers, thereby reducing the time
and expense of gathering information from different suppliers
offline.
A B2B may also be organized around the dynamic pricing
10
of goods. In a dynamic pricing format, the B2B exchange
United States range from $50 billion and $150 billion, which would represent
about 75% of the world’s B2B sales. See id. The wide variance in estimates is
due in part to the lack of consensus on what constitutes a B2B sale, e.g., does
it include a transaction that is initiated, but not completed, on the Internet?
See Katz, supra note 1, at 2.
6. See Joel Simkins, Vice President of energyLeader.com,
Comments regarding B2B Electronic Marketplaces (June 20-30, 2000)
<http://www.ftc.gov/bc/b2b/comments/>. Thus, for example, an independent
vertical exchange may consist of a group of toy manufacturers, a group of toy
wholesalers who purchase toys from the manufacturers, and a group of toy
retailers who purchase toys from the wholesalers for ultimate resale to
consumers.
7. See id. at 6.
8. For example, a horizontal exchange may be formed between makers
(sellers) of various office supplies and businesses (buyers) of any industry in
need of purchasing such goods.
9. See Entering the 21st Century: Competition Policy in the World of B2B
Electronic Marketplaces: A Report By Federal Trade Commission Staff, Part 1
at 8 (Oct., 2000) <http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/10/index.htm#26>.
10. See Charles Phillips and Mary Meeker, Morgan Stanley Dean Witter,
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matches buyers and sellers in real time as bids and quotes are
11
posted onto the system.
B2B’s may also function as auctions in which buyers bid to
purchase goods offered for sale by sellers, or, alternatively,
where buyers post orders for a specified good and suppliers bid
12
for the right to supply the good. A twist on this model is a
reverse auction, in which a supplier posts an item for sale, and
buyers bid for the right to purchase the item.
The motivating force behind the creation of B2B exchanges
is the elimination of costs. The initial efforts focused on
reducing the transaction costs involved in procuring goods by,
among other things, eliminating paper work and reducing
13
While these efforts remain perhaps
errors in procurement.
the primary driving force behind B2B commerce, proponents of
these exchanges have more recently begun to tout additional
benefits that are expected to reduce costs at all stages of the
supply chain. For example, B2B exchanges are purported to
reduce prices of goods by encouraging competition among

The B2B Internet Report: Collaborative Commerce, 28 (April 2000) (visited
April 9, 2001) <http://www.ftc.gov.bc/b2b/comments/msdw-b2breport.pdf>.
11. See id.
12. See id. Web-based auction sites such as ebay.com are similar to this
format, except that they represent business-to-consumer (B2C) operations
rather than business-to-business (B2B) ones. See eBay (visited April 9, 2001)
<http://www.ebay.com>.
13. See Jerry Jasinowski, President, National Association of
Manufacturers, Testimony Delivered to the Federal Trade Commission
Workshop
on
Electronic
Marketplaces
(visited
April
9,
2001)
<http://www.ftc.gov>. As an example of the way B2B activities can cut
transaction costs, consider the case of the Norfolk Southern Railway.
Previously, each time the firm required the performance of repair work, a
manager had to spend hours calling various construction firms for price
quotes. See Laura Cohn, et al., B2B: The Hottest Net Bet Yet? BUSINESSWEEK
ONLINE 2 (January 17, 2000) <http://www.businessweek.com:/2000/00_03/
b3664065.htm?scriptFramed>. Now, the manager simply puts the repair work
up for bids on the RailNet-USA.com B2B exchange. See id. The process
results in the reception of bids from a far greater number of firms than before,
presumably resulting in more competitive bids, and frees up the manager to
work on other projects. See id. Carrefour, a French consumer retailer,
estimates that it has saved as much as thirty percent on its procurement of
goods using the GlobalNetExchange B2B internet Exchange. See Maria
Seminerio, All Aboard for Private B2B Marketplaces—Business Exchanges
With Controlled Memberships Are Gaining Popularity, EWEEK, 57 (Sept. 25,
2000) <http://www.zdnet.com/eweek/stories/general/0,11011,2629589,00.
html>. At General Electric, which is implementing e-processes throughout the
firm, chief information officer Gary M. Reiner estimates that purchases made
offline, which typically cost GE fifty to two hundred dollars per transaction,
cost only about one dollar if done online. See id. at 3.
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suppliers and increasing economies of scale.
In addition to reducing costs, some experts believe that
B2B exchanges may have additional benefits, including
16
encouraging the introduction of new products, leveling the
14. See id. By collecting a number of suppliers together in a B2B
exchange, buyers will be able to easily and quickly compare prices and terms
among all suppliers, forcing them to compete on price for their business. See
William Holstein, B2B is Rewriting the “Old Economy”, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP. (April 10, 2000) <http://www.usnews.com/usnews/issue/00410/b2b.htm>.
Under these circumstances, the resulting competitive market eliminates the
ability of a supplier to set prices. See id. at 5 (quoting Kannan Srinivasan,
management and information-systems professor at Carnegie Mellon, as
stating that “[t]he good news is that if you’re a manufacturer, you can get
suppliers to compete against each other . . . but if you’re a supplier and you’re
not the most efficient one, this is a serious threat to you.”). The danger to
suppliers is most acute if their products are “commoditized," i.e.,
indistinguishable from those of competitors. See id.
15. See id. A firm’s total costs are equal to its fixed costs of production
(such as overhead, land, and factories) plus its variable costs of production,
which includes such things as the price of the components used to produce the
goods. See id. As the number of goods produced increases, the variable costs
increase accordingly, but the fixed costs remain stable up till the point where
the firm is at maximum production. See id. Hence, a firm’s total cost per unit
of produced goods decreases as more goods are produced. See id. This
principle produces a distinct advantage for firms which sell to larger, more
dense markets, since the larger demand for the firm’s goods allows the firm to
increase its production and thereby reduce its costs per unit of output. See id.
A firm serving a small, unconcentrated market, however, can reduce or
eliminate this advantage by participating in a B2B exchange. See id. For the
cost of setting up a Web site, the firm can potentially expand its market to
include buyers from around the globe, enabling it to produce efficiencies of
scale rivaling that of its larger competitors. See id. The ability to carry on
transactions at lower prices, and to produce goods at a lower cost per unit of
output, leads to a higher total output of goods and services in an economy. See
id. This result stems from the fact that as prices decline, the average inflation
rate decreases. See id. Hence, a higher lever of GDP results, since real GDP
is equal to the nominal GDP minus inflation. See id.
16. See Katz, supra note 1, at 3. The theory is that as a membership in a
B2B exchange increases a firm’s market, a large enough customer base could
exist for a niche product that would previously have been unprofitable, and
therefore never produced. See id.
The niche products manufactured as a result of the existence of B2B
exchanges may even include goods custom built to meet the needs of the
buyer. The benefit of custom-made products need not be limited to businessto-business transactions either. At least one dot.com, Toybuilders.com,
promises to produce custom made toys for consumers who visit its web site.
See Toybuilders (visited June 16, 2001) <http://www.Toybuilders.com>. The
process involves the consumer filling out an online questionnaire defining the
parameters of the desired toy. See id. The consumer is then given a price
quote within 24 hours, and if accepted, the company will forward formal
“eDrawings” of the proposed product to the consumer via email for final
approval. See id. Examples of possible toys include, upon submission of
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playing field for smaller competitors, and even reducing the
18
risk of an economic recession.
The importance of B2B’s in maintaining economic growth
in today’s disinflationary economy is potentially staggering.
Under current economic conditions, firms experience difficulty
in raising prices to increase profits or absorbing increases in
the costs of labor or raw materials. In this context, the
existence of B2B’s provides an attractive, alternative route to
enhance profitability through the reduction of transactional
19
costs as opposed to raising prices, as well as reducing the risk
to the financial health of the firm caused by excessive inventory
levels during periods of economic contraction. One recent
Goldman Sachs study concludes that the growth of electronic
B2B commerce will eventually increase the economic growth of
20
industrialized nations by about 0.25% annually.

personal photographs, action figures bearing the likeness of the purchaser.
See id. “The only limiting factor here is literally your imagination!” boasts the
website. Id.
17. See Jasinowski, supra note 13.
18. See id. The smoothing out of the business cycle is attributable to the
claim that B2B’s will improve a firm’s ability to manage its inventory. See id.
Inappropriately large inventory levels can aggravate or even cause an
economic downturn. A firm with a large inventory will respond to a decrease
in consumer demand for its goods by cutting back production. See id. The
resulting deleterious effect of reducing production, such as the layoff of
workers, can lead to a vicious circle in which consumer demand is further
reduced by the lowered buying power of the unemployed workers, causing
further reductions in production at other firms. This downward spiral can
cause an economy to enter a period of overall contraction. See id.
19. See, e.g., Denver Management Group, E-Business or Out of Business
(visited April 9, 2001) <http://www.denvermanagement.com/ebizout.htm>
(quoting Thomas Carpenter, managing director of ASB Capital Management,
Inc., as saying “[t]he Internet represents the most powerful engine of deflation
in the modern era.”). At least one analyst has predicted that the Internet will
cut the cost of producing a car by 14%, or about $3,650.00. See Andrew Cassel,
E-commerce in Infancy: Internet Trade Could Make Purchases Faster, Cheaper
for Consumers, Businesses, DETROIT FREE PRESS (May 22, 2000)
<http://www.freep.com/money/business/eecon22_20000522.htm>.
20. See id. at 3. Since the U.S. GDP is presently about $9 trillion per
year, a 0.25% increase in growth would produce an extra $23 billion in goods
and services in the first year alone. See id.
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II. COLLABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS AND ANTITRUST
LAW
Despite their inherent promise, B2B exchanges may, by
their very nature, induce antitrust concerns on the part of the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC). Antitrust issues arise
because B2B exchanges involve groups of competitors in a
given industry joining a single forum in which information on
buying and selling patterns may be exchanged between them.
Because the emergence of B2B exchanges is a very recent
occurrence, little has been published in the literature on the
21
antitrust issues raised by these exchanges. Furthermore, the
FTC has not yet formulated any regulations specifically
tailored to B2B entities. However, the following discussion is a
description of how the FTC has approached analogous entities
in the past.
A. THE FTC APPROACH TO ANTITRUST ISSUES
Business-to-business marketplaces are generally regarded
22
as being similar to joint ventures. In April 2000, the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) and the U.S. Department of Justice
23
(DOJ) issued guidelines (“Antitrust Guidelines”) explaining
how these two federal agencies analyze the legality of
24
competitor collaborations under antitrust law. The FTC and
DOJ utilize one of two types of analysis used by the U.S.
Supreme Court when scrutinizing competitor collaborations:
25
the per se rule and the rule of reason.

21. A January 2001 Lexis search of combined law reviews produced 17
journal articles mentioning B2B. Of these, none focused on antitrust issues.
22. See FTC Enforcers Believe B2B Auctions Are Similar to JVs, FTC
WATCH, Apr. 10, 2000.
23. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,
ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR COLLABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS (April
2000).
24. A “competitor collaboration” is defined as “a set of one or more
agreements, other than merger agreements, between or among competitors to
engage in economic activity, and the economic activity resulting therefrom.”
Id. at 2.
25. See National Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692
(1978).
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1. The Per Se Illegal Rule
26

A collaborative agreement that nearly always tends to
raise prices or reduce output is usually held to be illegal per
27
se.
An illegal per se collaboration usually involves an
agreement not to compete on price or output, and encompasses
agreements “to fix prices or output, rig bids, or share or divide
markets by allocating customers, suppliers, territories or lines
28
of commerce.” Such agreements are presumed illegal without
any inquiry to the actual competitive effects or claimed
29
business purposes of the agreement. Even an otherwise per se
illegal agreement, however, may overcome a presumption of
illegality if the agreement results in an efficiency-enhancing
integration of economic activity which is reasonably related to
the agreement, and is reasonably necessary to achieve
30
procompetitive benefits.
2. The Rule of Reason
Any agreement not presumed illegal under the per se rule
is analyzed under the rule of reason, wherein the
collaboration’s procompetitive benefits are weighed against its
anticompetitive benefits to determine the overall effect on
31
competition. The rule of reason analysis involves comparing

26. To qualify as a collaboration, there must be an agreement between
competitors to engage in economic activity. See ANTITRUST GUIDELINES,
supra note 23, at 2. The definition implies a “meeting of the minds” or a
“conscious commitment to a common scheme.” See Jonathan B. Baker,
Identifying Horizontal Price Fixing in the Electronic Marketplace, 65
ANTITRUST L.J. 41 (1996); Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S.
752, 764 n.9 (1984) (stating that to prove a meeting of the minds, “evidence
must be documented both that the distributor communicated its acquiescence
or agreement, and that this was sought by the manufacturer.”).
27. See California Dental Ass’n v. F.T.C., 526 U.S. 756 (1999).
28. See ANTITRUST GUIDELINES, supra note 23, at 8.
29. See id.
30. See Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 339 n.7,
356-57 (1982). An agreement need not be essential in order to be reasonably
necessary. See ANTITRUST GUIDELINES, supra note 23, at 9. The central issue
in establishing reasonable necessity is whether or not the collaborators could
obtain a comparable efficiency through practical, significantly less restrictive
means. See Maricopa County Medical Soc’y, 457 U.S. at 352-53 (stating that
even though establishing a maximum fee for a physician’s service was
beneficial, it was not necessary for physicians to create the schedule
themselves as opposed to insurers).
31. See ANTITRUST GUIDELINES, supra note 23, at 10.
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the level of competition under the agreement with the
32
competition level that would occur without the agreement. A
harm to competition is established if an agreement would likely
raise prices or reduce output, quality, service, or innovation
below what would likely occur without the agreement taking
33
place.
If it is determined that an agreement evidences by its very
34
nature a likely competitive harm, or if anticompetitive harm
35
has already occurred, the FTC or DOJ will challenge the
agreement without further analysis unless other benefits exist
36
which could offset the harm to competition. If, however, it is
found that a potential anticompetitive effect exists, yet such
harm either has not yet occurred or is not evident by the nature
of the agreement, a detailed market analysis of the agreement
37
is commenced. Such an analysis entails studying any factor
which may increase or decrease competitive harms, including
the market shares held by the collaborators, the ability and
incentive of the collaborators to compete independently from
38
each other, and whether barriers to entry exist which would
39
deter new competitors from entering the market. Clauses in a
collaborative agreement which may lead to a conclusion that an
anticompetitive effect exists include those which limit the
40
ability of a collaborator to make independent decisions,
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. See California Dental Ass’n at 1612-13, 1617.
35. See F.T.C. v. Indiana Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 459 (declaring
that “proof of actual detrimental effects” makes an inquiry into market power
unnecessary).
36. See id. at 460-61.
37. See ANTITRUST GUIDELINES, supra note 23, at 11.
38. See id.
39. A collaboration will not be challenged if the barrier to entry for
potential competitors is small enough such that their entry into the market
would be timely, likely and sufficient to deter the anticompetitive harm. See
id. at 22. The likelihood of entry is determined based upon whether potential
competitors possess the competency and incentives necessary to enter the
field. See id.
40. Such collaborations may take a variety of different forms. Production
collaborations involve an agreement to jointly produce a product for sale in
order to produce a good more efficiently. See id. at 13. Though production
collaborations may be procompetitive in the sense that consumers may obtain
the good at a lower price, they may also have anticompetitive effects if they
involve an agreement on the amount of product produced, or the price at
which it is sold. See id. Marketing collaborations are those in which the
participants agree to jointly “sell, distribute, or promote goods or services that
are either jointly or individually produced.” Id. at 14. A production
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combine control over production, key assets, or decisions on
price, output, or other factors sensitive to competition, or may
41
cause an increase in market power.
If the detailed market analysis does not reveal potentially
42
If
anticompetitive effects, the investigation is ended.
anticompetitive effects are found, however, an analysis is
undertaken to determine whether the agreement is “necessary
to achieve procompetitive benefits that likely would offset
43
anticompetitive harms."
Of particular interest to an antitrust analysis of B2B
exchanges are agreements which involve the exchange of
sensitive information among the parties, since the sharing of
44
Of
information may lead to collusions on price or output.
agreement may be procompetitive if it results in a faster and more efficient
See id.
distribution of the product to the marketplace.
It may be
anticompetitive, however, if it results in the fixing of a competitively
significant variable, such as an agreement to jointly promote a product by
eliminating comparative advertising in a manner which would restrict the
information consumers receive concerning the product. See id. A buying
collaboration involves an agreement to jointly purchase inputs. See id. Such a
collaboration may be procompetitive by reducing costs through centralization
of ordering or combining warehouse functions. See id. An anticompetitive
effect may prevail, however, if the agreement enables the buyers to purchase
the input at a price below that which would prevail without the agreement.
See id. A collaboration may also take the form of an agreement to practice
joint research and development (R&D). Such an agreement is procompetitive
in that it can enable more efficient development of new goods or services. See
id. It may be anticompetitive, however, if it reduces the amount of innovation
that would have occurred if each participant in the agreement had conducted
R&D separately. See id.
41. Market power is defined as a seller’s ability to profitably keep prices
above competitive levels for a significant time, or alternatively, as a buyer’s
ability to profitably reduce the price of a product below the competitive level
for a significant time. See ANTITRUST GUIDELINES, supra note 23, at n. 30.
42. See id.
43. See id. at 12.
44. See id. at 15. A recent example of alleged online collusion between
competitors over price involved the nation’s airlines. In U.S. v. Airline Tariff
Publishing Co., Proposed Final Judgment and Competitive Impact Statement,
58 FR 3971 (1993), the defendant Airline Tariff Publishing Co. (“ATP”), was
owned by seven of the nation’s major airlines and served as the “central source
for the collection, organization, and dissemination of fare information for
virtually every domestic airline.” Id. at 3975. ATP operated a computerized
fare system which disseminated to each airline information on the fares
charged on every route served by every other airline. See id. Each weekday,
airlines submitted a list of proposed changes which it wished to make to its
fares. See id. Attached to each proposed fare change was a “first ticket date”
representing the date on which the fare change was scheduled to become
effective. See id. Also, attached to each fare currently offered for sale was a
“second ticket date” which indicated the date at which the listed price was
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special concern is the sharing of information concerning prices,
output, costs, strategic planning, current and future business
plans, or the sharing of the individual, as opposed to
45
aggregated, information of the parties to the agreement.

scheduled to expire. See id. Both the first and second ticket dates were
tentative and could be changed or eliminated at any time; thus, a proposed
fare change may be repeatedly delayed by changing the first ticket date to a
time further and further in the future, or may never take place at all if
withdrawn by the airline. See id. Hence, by accessing the ATP system, the
airlines could monitor each other’s proposed fare changes and analyze them to
discern any patterns. See id. The U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) sued
ATP and the participating airlines, alleging that the ATP system was a per se
illegal price fixing agreement in that the airlines used the ATP system to
illegally form agreements to fix prices, eliminate discounted fares, and set fare
restrictions. See id. In particular, DOJ charged that the use of “first ticket
dates” amounted to a communication of a desire to increase fares on a selected
route to which competing airlines could agree to or, alternatively, to submit an
alternative plan. See id. For example, Carrier A could propose to increase a
given fare by filing the change with ATP with a first ticket date two weeks in
the future. See id. at 3976. Carrier B could then signal its approval of the
price hike by filing a similar fare change on the same route, with a first ticket
See id.
date matching that of the change proposed by Carrier A.
Alternatively, a process of negotiation could ensue in which Carrier A would
agree only to a smaller increase than proposed by Carrier A. See id. The
negotiating process ended only after all airlines filed the same fare in the
same market with the same first ticket, thus indicating their commitment to
the fare hike. See id. Until all airlines agreed to the higher price, Carrier A
could repeatedly postpone the first ticket date on the targeted flight to prevent
the fare from taking effect until all competing airlines were onboard. See id.
The process serves as a way, therefore, for Carrier A to test out a proposed
fare change without it actually taking effect until it knows that other airlines
will agree to match it. See id.
A second example of alleged price collusion involving electronic interactions
between competitors concerns the NASDAQ computerized stock quotation
system. The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) sued major NASDAQ securities
firms which acted as “marketmakers” by trading in particular NASDAQ
stocks. See Second Amended Refiled Consolidated Complaint of the DOJ v.
NASDAQ Marketmakers, (S.D.N.Y).
The DOJ charged that the
marketmakers conspired to maintain the spreads (the difference between the
“bid” price and the “ask” price) paid by securities buyers and sellers at supracompetitive prices by refusing to quote bid and ask prices in odd-eighths (e.g.,
1/8, 3/8, 5/8) and instead widening the spread to even eighths (e.g., 2/8, 4/8,
6/8). See id. at 14. Marketmakers allegedly punished those firms that refused
to participate and “broke the spread” by refusing to conduct business with
those firms in other contexts, trading around a marketmaker who broke the
spread, and making threatening phone calls to them demanding that they fall
into line. See id. at 14-15.
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B. SAFETY ZONES
The FTC and DOJ have established “safety zones” which
describe situations in which a collaboration agreement will be
46
presumed lawful. First, a collaboration will generally not be
challenged when the market shares of the collaboration and its
members equal no more than twenty percent of the market in
47
which competition may be affected. Second, a collaboration is
presumed lawful if at least three other independently
controlled research efforts have the assets, incentive, and other
traits necessary to engage in R&D very similar to that of the
48
collaboration.
C.

THE POTENTIAL ANTITRUST DANGERS INHERENT IN B2B
EXCHANGES

1. Monopsony
B2B exchanges hold the potential to create a “once in a
49
lifetime shift” in power from suppliers to buyers. One way in
which buyers in an exchange may seek to reduce their costs is
by pooling their purchase orders for a given good together, and
using the resulting size of the order to negotiate a volume
50
The danger, however, is that the
discount with a seller.
purchasers may be able to exercise monopsony power by
ganging up on the seller and forcing it to sell the product at a
price that is below that which would normally prevail in a
51
competitive market.
46. See ANTITRUST GUIDELINES, supra note 23, at 26.
47. See id. This safety zone does not apply to agreements which are per se
illegal, or that would be challenged even without the undertaking of a detailed
market analysis. See id.
48. See id. at 26-27. This safety zone also does not apply to per se illegal
agreements, or those challenged without a detailed market analysis. See id.
49. See Comments by Rick Warren-Boulton, TRANSCRIPTS OF THE
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION PUBLIC WORKSHOP: COMPETITION POLICY IN
THE WORLD OF B2B ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACES (visited April 9, 2001)
<http://www.ftc.gov>.
50. See id.
51. It is important to distinguish illegal monopsony power from regular
bargaining power. Both types of behavior result in the purchaser paying a
lower price for goods. A monopsonist, however, achieves that result by
reducing demand for the goods by restricting its level of purchases to an extent
sufficient to force the seller to reduce the price in order to unload the goods.
The reduction in demand then typically leads the seller to curtail production of
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The danger of monopsony is most present in B2B
exchanges where there is a small group of purchasers who
account for a large portion of the market for a specialized
52
good. In such a case, the seller will feel compelled to deal with
the buyers on their terms; if, however, the market for the good
is large and fragmented, the seller has the negotiating leverage
to “walk away” from the table and instead deal with other
groups of buyers outside of the exchange.
2. Price Fixing Through Information Exchange
A second antitrust risk associated with B2B exchanges
stems from the fact that the Internet allows for the aggregation
and analysis of copious information concerning the exchange’s
participants.
For example, in some B2B exchanges,
participants may be allowed to track the identities of each
buyer and seller, as well as the amount of a good purchased
53
and the date and time, and price of the transaction. In a
model of perfect competition, where there is complete
transparency of all information to all participants in the
market, the availability of such information enhances buyer
choices and leads to increased competition between buyers and
54
sellers. In some circumstances, however, greater exchange of
information can actually result in reduced competition and
55
higher prices to consumers. Specifically, one danger in a B2B
exchange is that if all of the buyers know the prices that their
competitors are paying for their production inputs, they may be
able to predict the prices the competitors will charge to
56
consumers. Such knowledge may create conditions in which
the goods, thereby reducing overall output. In turn, the reduction in the final
output of goods available for purchase by consumers tends to increase the
retail price of the goods. Regular buying power, in contrast, involves a buyer
utilizing the particular strengths in its bargaining position to negotiate a
better price with the seller. Usually, the resulting lower price encourages the
buyer to purchase the goods in greater quantity, thus increasing the total
amount of goods available for purchase by the consumer, and therefore
lowering the retail price.
52. See id.
53. See Charles F. Rule, B2B or Collusion, 36 LEGAL TIMES (April 3,
2000).
54. See Jonathan B. Baker, Identifying Horizontal Price Fixing in the
Electronic Marketplace, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 41 (1996).
55. See id at 42.
56. See Peter L. de la Cruz & Sheila A. Millar, Comments Regarding B2B
Electronic Marketplaces (June 28, 2000) <http://www.ftc.gov/bc/b2b/comments
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the participants could tacitly collude on prices charged at
57
retail.
Furthermore, this same transparency of information
58
could lead to tacit allocation of markets.
If a company can
discern through the price inputs of its competitor that it is less
competitive in a given market, it may shift its resources out of
59
that market and into one in which it is more competitive.
3. Exclusion
A third antitrust danger lies in the possibility of excluding
certain buyers and/or sellers from participating in an exchange
or holding equity in it. For example, a B2B exchange might
require all buyer participants to purchase a certain percentage
of their goods through the exchange, or even prohibit them
entirely from making purchases through any other exchange.
Alternatively, a supplier-owned exchange could implement
rules making it difficult for any additional suppliers to join the
/kellerandheckman.pdf>.
57. Imagine, for example, that Company A is a manufacturer of a new
consumer video game system. As a member of a B2B purchasing exchange,
company A purchases on a certain date a quantity of memory chips which are
essential components of its product. Shortly thereafter, an earthquake
severely damages several South Korean factories which produce the memory
chips, causing the price of such chips to skyrocket. Company B, Company A’s
main competitor, is finalizing the production of a new video game system just
in time for the holiday shopping season to compete with Company A’s product.
Company B is forced to purchase its memory chips on the exchange at the
higher post-earthquake price. Company A, as a participant on the exchange,
notes Company B’s purchase and infers that Company B will be forced to price
its new product at a higher level due to the increased cost of the chip.
Company A then raises the price of its product over that which it would have
priced it without knowledge of the price of Company B’s production inputs.
58. See The Original Equipment Suppliers Association, Comments
Prepared for the Federal Trade Commission In Connection With Its Workshop
on Competition Policy in the World of B2B Electronic Marketplaces at 3 (June
29, 2000) <http://www.ftc.gov/bc/b2b/comments/oesa.pdf>.
59. See id. Generally, this process is not harmful, and in fact is the heart
of the competitive process. See id. However, outside of a transparent
marketplace, a company can never know for sure where its competitor’s
strengths and weaknesses are. See id. Therefore, the company will be forced
to make its choices on what is competitively optimal, and not based on what
its competitor’s position is. See id. In a B2B online exchange that is
transparent concerning the identities of buyers and sellers, however, no
uncertainty remains, since each competitor knows the quantity of goods
purchased and at what price by each competitor. See id. Thus, the
competitors will allocate their resources based on the actions of their
competitors, instead of responding to the demands of the market. See id. This
allocation results in a collusive situation in which the well-being of the
participants is enhanced at the expense of that of the end consumer. See id.
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60

exchange.
If most of the buyers in that industry purchase
exclusively through the B2B exchange, the suppliers not
allowed to join would find themselves completely shut out of
61
the market.
Furthermore, if a B2B exchange is run as a for-profit entity
which charges participants for each transaction carried out on
the exchange, those buyers (or sellers) which are equity owners
in the exchange would receive their respective shares of any
profits, wherein the profits would essentially serve as a rebate
on the fees which were charged to the equity owners on their
62
Thus, their transaction costs would be
own transactions.
effectively lowered relative to that of any non-equity
competitors who participate in the exchange, giving them a
63
competitive advantage.
III. CRITIQUING THE FTC'S RESPONSE TO THE PUBLIC
WORKSHOP ON B2B ELECTRONIC
MARKETPLACES
At issue in this Note is whether the guidelines for joint
venture agreements described above are adequate to police the
emerging sector of business-to-business online marketplaces.
An analysis of this issue may lead to several different
conclusions, including that: B2B marketplaces should be
regulated as joint ventures under already existent joint venture
antitrust guidelines; new regulations are required which
specifically address the unique issues which are generated by
60. If the owners of the exchange are larger companies, an easy way to
increase the barrier of entry into the exchange is to set the transaction fees
high enough to make it unfeasible for smaller firms to participate. Thus, even
if the exchange owners maintain ostensibly objective criteria for joining the
exchange, the rules in fact may be designed to keep out potential competitors.
A second way to keep out competitors lies in the software technologies
necessary to interact with participants in the exchange. Typically, the
exchange establishes a uniform set of variables and Internet locations which
the computerized systems of each participant must be able to read and write.
See id. An exchange may deny access to this information to an unwanted
potential participant, thus depriving it of the ability to fully make use of the
exchange. See id.
61. Fears about exclusion may no longer be merely theoretical. Already
some complaints about exclusionary practices have arisen. See Julia King,
Some Dispute FTC Finding In B2B Antitrust Report, COMPUTER WORLD (Nov.
6, 2000).
62. See Albert A. Foer, High Tech Needs Antitrust, FTC WATCH No. 546
(June 5, 2000). This technique is known as “raising rival’s costs.” See id.
63. See id.
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B2B marketplaces; or that no regulation of B2B exchanges by
the FTC or DOJ should take place at this early stage in their
64
development.
On June 29, 2000, the FTC held a public workshop on B2B
exchanges, bringing together designers, owners, operators, and
members of these entities to discuss their benefits as well as
65
the possible antitrust dangers which could arise. On October
26, 2000, this workshop culminated in the release by the FTC
of a report setting forth guideposts to use in evaluating
66
antitrust concerns in the context of B2B exchanges.
There is some evidence that a general consensus is forming
that the FTC’s present guidelines governing collaborations
among competitors provide a sufficient framework to address
67
the antitrust issues arising out of Internet B2B exchanges.
After all, the potential risks inherent to B2B’s such as price
fixing, exclusion, and monopsony are the same which crop up in
other traditional antitrust cases. Nevertheless, controversy
exists as to how (and when) the FTC’s collaboration guidelines

64. A hands-off, laissez-faire approach to B2B’s is grounded in the belief
that proper market incentives already exist to ensure that B2B’s do not
operate in an anticompetitive manner. See supra note 117 and accompanying
text. Easterbrook and Fischel provide a classic example of an argument that
government regulations are not necessary to ensure the proper functioning of
markets in a different context. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel,
Mandatory Disclosure & the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669 (1984)
(arguing that mandatory securities disclosure laws are superfluous).
65. See Federal Trade Commission, FTC to Hold Public Workshop to
Examine Competition Issues in Business-to-Business Electronic Marketplaces
(May 4, 2000) <http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2000/05/b2bworkshoop.htm>.
st
66. See Entering the 21 Century, supra note 9. This report, however,
merely represents the views of the FTC staff, and are not necessarily those of
the Commission as a whole. See id. at n.1.
67. See, e.g. Jasinowski supra note 13 (arguing that there is no need at
the present time “for specific rules concerning this sector”); Philip A. Proger,
Testimony to the Federal Trade Commission Workshop on Electronic
Marketplaces (2000) <http://www.ftc.gov> (visited April 9, 2001) (stating that
“[I]’m sort of skeptical that there is anything highly unusual about B2B’s, . . .
they may be very, very pro competitive, but in the end we’re going to have to
do traditional antitrust analysis, and I think the joint venture analysis and
the Collaboration Guidelines are appropriate in this framework.”); Laura A.
Wilkinson, Testimony to the Federal Trade Commission Workshop on
Electronic Marketplaces (2000) <http://www.ftc.gov> (visited April 9,
2001)(arguing that “the antitrust laws and guidelines that we have in place in
terms of mergers and joint ventures or collaborations among competitors all
take in to effect [B2B’s] as well so I think that as the dust settles, you’ll find
that the analysis remains the same, and the issues remain the same in terms
of monopoly, monopsony, collusion and information exchange kinds of
issues.”).
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should be applied to B2B’s. An analysis of these issues
suggests that while the FTC should exercise great caution in
promulgating new regulations which could have a chilling
effect on the nascent B2B industry, some steps must be taken
to specifically address the potential problems arising from
information sharing between competitors on a B2B electronic
marketplace.
A.

PREVENTING MONOPSONY

One way in which buyers may engage in monopsonistic
behavior is by limiting the number of suppliers allowed onto
the exchange. This danger is most apparent in the minority of
industries which are non-fragmented; that is, those which are
68
dominated by a small number of larger purchasers.
Monopsony can also occur where the buyers, acting in concert,
restrict their purchases to force the sellers to reduce prices to
make a sale.
A telltale sign of monopsonistic behavior of the second type
is a requirement by the exchange that each member must deal
69
exclusively with the exchange. This telltale behavior occurs
because by restricting purchases to drive down the price, each
purchaser will find itself unable to obtain as many goods as in a
70
The purchasers will therefore
non-monopsonistic situation.
have an incentive to buy additional goods outside of the
exchange, thereby providing an incentive for the exchange to
71
restrict a buyer’s purchases outside of the exchange.
The Competition Policy Report does not provide any
framework specifically tailored to B2B’s for determining if
monopsonistic practices exist. The Report notes, however, that
under the Competitor Collaboration Guidelines, whether or not
the exercise of monopsonistic power would induce the entry of

68. The danger of monopsony is generally only present in B2B exchanges
featuring dynamic pricing, such as a “reverse auction” where the sellers bid to
provide for the buyer’s requirement, or some other mechanism wherein the
price between buyer and seller is negotiated. Most exchanges to date,
however, involve “static pricing,” where each seller’s catalog is online with a
fixed price for each item. There is therefore no opportunity for the buyers to
“gang up” on the sellers to force them to reduce prices.
st
69. See Entering the 21 Century, supra note 9, at Part 3, 14 (noting that
“[e]xclusivity policies that require that the group’s members purchase through
the group may make the exercise of monopsony power easier”).
70. See id.
71. See id.
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new buyers onto the exchange to mitigate the monopsonistic
effects is a relevant consideration in determining if a B2B is in
72
violation of antitrust laws.
Additionally, participants at the Public Workshop put
forward various regulations whose enactment could help
prevent the development of monopsonistic practices. For
example, the FTC could prohibit B2B’s from requiring their
members to refrain from making purchases outside of the
73
exchange. Such a rule, however, could backfire by preventing
many legitimate B2B’s from generating the profits necessary
74
for their survival. Many of the B2B’s formed thus far have
75
been created by a small number of major industry players,
suggesting that B2B exchanges require a certain minimum
volume of purchases through the exchange in order to generate
sufficient revenue to run the exchange, as well as to provide
enough business on the exchange to encourage a sufficient
76
number of sellers to participate.
Prohibiting a B2B from enacting restrictions on its
members could discourage the formation of B2B exchanges. In
sum, the imposition of new regulations on B2B exchanges
designed to prevent monopsonistic practices may end up
causing more harm than they prevent, and therefore the FTC
should refrain from promulgating new regulations addressing
these dangers until the B2B industry reaches the level of
maturity necessary to establish what regulations may be
needed to reasonably address these concerns, while not unduly
harming the ability of B2B’s to operate.
In the future, the Competition Policy Report’s emphasis on
the ability of monopsonistic practices to induce new buyers onto
77
the exchange may prove useful as a starting point for
enforcing antitrust laws with respect to B2B’s and monopsony.
The lack of such inducement can serve as a signal that any
benefits derived from limiting participants’ abilities to transact
outside of the B2B exchange are outweighed by considerations
of preventing the occurrence of anti-competitive practices.
72. See id. at Part 3, 15.
73. See Robert E. Bloch & Scott P. Perlman,
Analysis of Antitrust Issues Raised By B2B Exchanges (visited June 16, 2000)
<http://www.ftc.gov/bc/b2b/comments/blockarticle.pdf>. This proposal is also
relevant to the discussion on exclusion in Part II B of this Note.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. See id.
77. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
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Additionally, the FTC should strongly encourage B2B’s to
form an independent, third party body to ensure that fair,
objective standards are employed in determining which entities
are allowed onto the B2B. This can be accomplished by making
it clear that the existence of such an independent body,
especially in the case of B2B’s in highly fragmented industries,
will be considered as relevant evidence of compliance with the
antitrust laws in any investigation of possible monopsonistic
practices.
B. PREVENTING UNLAWFUL EXCLUSION
In tackling the issue of anticompetitive exclusions of
participants from a B2B exchange, the Competition Policy
Report again relies on the standard rule of reason analysis.
Hence, the Report asks if the exclusion of a given firm from a
78
B2B exchange is likely to result in anticompetitive harm.
Next, it is determined whether the denial of access is
reasonably necessary to achieve procompetitive benefits that
79
likely offset the anticompetitive harm. The report notes that
key factors may shape the analysis, including considerations of
whether the B2B is the only way the product can be bought or
sold at reasonable prices, whether the barrier of entry to the
creation of a new B2B to compete with the exclusionary one is
sufficiently low, and whether the denial of access to a new
member gives the existing members of a B2B the power to
maintain prices of products above that which would otherwise
80
prevail.
Rather than relying on this traditional antitrust analysis,
some have promoted further steps to ensure fairness and
inclusionary practices on B2B exchanges.
It has been
suggested that each B2B exchange should develop objective
81
criteria by which a new buyer or seller will be admitted. It is
argued that the absence of an independent body to establish
standards for the exchange and evaluate admission to the
exchange should be treated as a potentially anticompetitive
82
behavior under an antitrust analysis.
st

78. See Entering the 21 Century, supra note 9, at Part 3, 20.
79. See id.
80. See id. at 20-22.
81. See, e.g., The Original Equipment Suppliers’ Association, supra note
58, at 7.
82. See id.
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Another possible rule would require B2B’s to have an open
exchange wherein any entity which could meet reasonable,
objective criteria would be admitted. Such a rule is unwise,
however, because valid reasons may exist for a B2B to exclude
additional members.
For example, to be profitable and
effective, a B2B must be able to assure buyers, who may be
purchasing items in a blind auction without knowing the
identities of the suppliers, that the suppliers are trustworthy
83
and capable of delivering goods to the buyer’s specifications.
Thus, some buyers may wish to form a B2B exchange whose
membership is limited to those suppliers it has worked with in
84
the past and found trustworthy. At this early stage in B2B
development, it is difficult to see how the FTC could have a
firm enough grasp of when exclusion is or is not necessary to
the successful functioning of a B2B. In fact, the current
relative dearth of B2B’s which practice exclusionary tactics
suggests that little incentive to exclude may exist except in
85
Actions
situations when such practices may be legitimate.
taken against B2B’s for alleged exclusionary tactics in violation
of the Collaboration Guidelines risk stifling the innovation and
experimentation necessary to develop successful B2B business
86
In light of the current scarcity of exclusionary
models.
practices, the possible benefits of such practices in certain

83. See Steven J. Kafka, Testimony to the FTC Workshop (declaring that
“for buyers, the credibility of the offer is absolutely an issue in who’s making
the offer . . . is the product that they’re offering what they say it is, are they
going to deliver it when they say they will, et cetera.”).
See
84. Such arrangements are already becoming commonplace.
Seminerio, supra note 13. Additional reasons for forming such exchanges are
that dealing with and analyzing a large number of bids can be costly and timeconsuming. See id. Some firms also fear the possibility of data security
problems in posting information on a public exchange. See id.
85. See Hal Loevy, Testimony to the FTC Workshop 304 (visited April 9,
2001) <http://www.ftc.gov>. Mr. Loevy stated that:
If there are 700 [B2B] marketplaces in the world today,
we’ve talked to some 200, 250 of them, and I can only recall
two or three cases where those marketplaces were requiring
exclusivity. And I know of two of them at least that don’t
exist anymore.
So, I couldn’t agree more that the
exclusivity—the exclusivity is something which won’t exist,
which will not allow a marketplace to carry forward. See id.
86. Evidence has already accrued indicating that the mere possibility of
FTC investigations of B2B exchanges has a chilling effect on their formation.
Recently, the FTC investigation into an exchange created by major
automakers caused parts suppliers interested in joining the exchange to put
their plans on hold. See Erich Luening, Investigation of Auto Marketplaces
Scares Off Some Players (May 4, 2000).
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circumstances, and the danger of over-regulating a fragile,
developing business model, the FTC’s adherence to alreadyexisting antitrust guidelines, as opposed to the promulgation of
additional regulations aimed at B2B exchanges, represents the
proper approach to the exclusionary practice issue.
Nevertheless, even if B2B’s show little evidence of
practicing exclusionary tactics in terms of admission of
members, there are indications that some B2B’s owned by large
players in a given industry are practicing a different type of
exclusion: exercising their power to drive competitors out of
business by restricting the ability of their participants to
87
transact with competing exchanges. It is imperative that the
FTC monitors such developments to ensure that such activities
do not run afoul of the antitrust laws.
At the present time, however, it appears that the current
regulatory framework is sufficient to address this type of
exclusion problem. Under the last step of the rule of reason
approach, taken only after it is determined that
anticompetitive effects are existent, it is determined whether
the agreement or requirement in question is “necessary to
achieve procompetitive benefits that likely would offset
88
anticompetitive harm." Under this step, the FTC must find
that the limitations on participants’ abilities to transact outside
of the exchange produce sufficiently procompetitive results.
The B2B could satisfy this requirement, for example, by
showing that due to the economics of the market, it needs the
restrictions to ensure that it obtains sufficient revenue to
operate. The FTC should make it clear that if this final step of
the rule of reason analysis is reached, the B2B will bear the
burden of making such a showing.
87. See supra notes Julia King, Some Dispute FTC Finding In B2B
Antitrust
Report,
WORLD,
Nov.
6,
2000
COMPUTER
<http://www.computerworld.com/cwi/story/0,1199,NAV65-665_STO53357,00.
html> (quoting Ravi Kalakota, chairman of Hsupply.com, an independent
exchange serving the hospitality industry, as saying, “I don’t know what the
FTC was smoking, but they’re not looking at the evidence” and claiming that
he knows multiple hotel operators who are barred from dealing with his
exchange under franchise agreements with large hotel companies such as
Hyatt Corporation and Marriott International, Incorporated, both of whom are
partners in a competing exchange, Avendra). Hsupply.com is now defunct, yet
another victim of the dearth of investor interest in providing further capital to
Internet firms. See Mark Haley, The Rise and Fall of Hsupply.com,
HOSPITALITY UPGRADE (Spring 2001) <http://www.hotel-online.com/
Neo?News?PR2001_2nd?Apr01_hsupplyFall.html>.
88. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
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C. PREVENTING PRICE FIXING
In the face of concerns about price fixing on B2B exchanges
caused by the free flow of information among buyers and
sellers, the Competition Policy Report cautions that whether an
information-sharing agreement is likely to harm competition
89
depends on facts unique to each situation. The Report then
proceeds to put forth an analysis of such agreements which
adheres closely to principles previously stated in the
90
Collaboration Guidelines. The Report states five factors for
consideration in evaluating the flow of information on B2B
exchanges to determine the likelihood of anticompetitive
effects.
First, the Report inquires about the structure of the
market the B2B serves, noting that the more concentration
present in the market, the greater chance for an adverse
91
Second, the Report states that
impact on competition.
information shared among competitors may cause greater
92
concern than information shared with non-competitors.
Third, the Report quotes from the Collaboration Guidelines in
stating that “[o]ther things being equal, the sharing of
information relating to price, output, costs, or strategic
planning is more likely to raise competitive concern than the
sharing of information relating to less competitively sensitive
93
Fourth, the Report states that the sharing of
variables."
future pricing information is greater cause for concern than
94
Finally, the Report
sharing data about old transactions.
declares that if the shared information is available elsewhere
besides on the B2B exchange, less concern exists about
95
antitrust violations.
Proceeding again under traditional rule of reason analysis,
the Report states that if likely anticompetitive effects are
found, the investigation should then shift to an examination of
the efficiencies which would result from the information
sharing practice, and, finally, whether or not practical,
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

st

See Entering the 21 Century, supra note 9, at § 3, at 7.
See supra note 9, at 7-13.
See supra note 9, at 7.
See supra note 9, at 8.
See id.
See supra note 9, at 8-9.
See supra note 9, at 5-6.
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significantly less restrictive alternatives exist which would
96
achieve the same efficiencies.
The Competition Policy Report’s recitation of these factors,
however, raises troubling questions about the relevancy of
these existing antitrust policies to electronic transactions,
particularly those taking place on B2B exchanges.
In
particular, the five-factor analysis appears to be of limited
usefulness in analyzing certain types of B2B exchanges. By the
very nature of a transparent B2B exchange, current, and
perhaps even real time information, concerning sensitive
variables such as prices and costs will be shared among
97
competitors. Thus, the second, third, and fourth factors may
be present in any B2B exchange in which participants can view
each other’s current prices and offers to buy. Moreover, the
first factor, which looks unfavorably upon a high degree of
market concentration in a given exchange, could have a chilling
effect on the industry, since such concentration may be
essential to achieve the critical mass necessary to operate a
98
B2B exchange, as discussed in Part III, Section A of this Note.
The five-factor analysis, therefore, may be of little help in
distinguishing which transparent B2B’s are engaging in
anticompetitive practices.
Just as importantly, the FTC’s Rule of Reason approach is
applied to collaborations between competitors which may have
99
anticompetitive effects. A B2B exchange in which buyers and
sellers have immediate, transparent access to bids, sales, and
prices, however, represents a state of “rapid information
exchange” under which tacit collusion on pricing can take place
100
without any evidence left behind of an actual collaboration.
For example, under conditions of rapid information exchange, a
seller’s incentive to deviate from a price may be significantly
101
A seller’s intent in cutting prices is the desire to
reduced.
96. See id.
97. See supra notes 53-59 and accompanying text.
98. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
99. See supra notes 26-43 and accompanying text.
100. The rapidity with which information can be exchanged on a B2B
marketplace makes it much easier for sellers to monitor each other’s prices.
As an analogy, consider the ease with which online retailers today can monitor
the prices of their competitors. It has been noted that online merchants are
closely monitoring each other’s prices since the best prices of popular items,
such as books, are usually within a few cents of each other. See Hal R. Varian,
Online Commerce Creates Strange Competition, N.Y. TIMES, August 24, 2000.
101. See Jonathan B. Baker, Identifying Horizontal Price Fixing in the
Electronic Marketplace, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 41 (1996).
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102

reap increased sales from the lower price.
If competitors on
the B2B exchange can immediately detect and match the
reduction in price, however, the seller who first cuts prices will
gain only a fraction of any increase in purchases caused by the
103
lower selling price. Thus, a seller may have little incentive to
104
cut prices in the first place.
Therefore, market transparency
105
can actually facilitate above-market pricing.
In the absence
of rapid information exchange, maintaining coordinated pricing
is more difficult, because a seller can never be certain that a
competitor is not breaking the price-fixing agreement by
106
engaging in secret price cuts.
The current collaboration antitrust guidelines which the
FTC intends to apply to B2B exchanges do not adequately
address this phenomenon. Mere “follow the leader” behavior,
in which no seller is willing to cut prices unless another seller
does so first, is not illegal as long as there is no actual
agreement, tacit or otherwise, to fix prices, even if the result is
107
In employing the rule of reason
supracompetitive pricing.
analysis, courts and the FTC do not assume that mere price
matching constitutes an agreement to fix prices. Rather, they
look for additional factors which would support an inference
108
To
that an agreement to fix prices exists among competitors.
do otherwise could subject a competitor to the rule of reason
analysis any time it attempted to compete with another

102. See id.
103. See id.
104. See id.
105. See id.
106. In Clamp-All Corp. v. Cast-Iron Soil Pipe Inst., the First Circuit Court
of Appeals stated that:
The problem [for a firm participating in a price-fixing
agreement] is that each also knows that for it alone the best
of all possible worlds is to attract customers through a small
price cut not matched by others. Since they all know this,
how can they keep each other from cutting prices? How can
they prevent the forces of competition from breaking out,
with one or another firm yielding to the temptation to cut
its own prices while hoping the others will not match the
low price? . . . [e]ach fears that . . . its competitors will
“chisel” on the tacit pricing arrangement, perhaps through
secret or selective price cut.
Clamp-All Corp v. Cast-Iron Soil Pipe Inst., 851 F.2d 478, 484-85 (1st Cir.
1988).
107. See Baker, supra note 97.
108. See id.
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109

competitor by matching a reduction in price.
110
In the airlines-price fixing case, the government was able
to detect evidence of an agreement to fix the prices of air fares
because the data attached to those fares on the computer
reservation system allowed airlines to test in advance whether
or not other airlines would go along with a proposed fare
111
The complex behavior that resulted from this practice
hike.
produced a strong inference that tacit price-fixing agreements
112
were taking place.
Most B2B exchanges, however, do not provide mechanisms
through which buyers and sellers can signal each other about
113
While this may make it more
future proposed price changes.
difficult for price coordination to occur, it can also make it far
more difficult for the government to produce an inference that
such price coordination is occurring, since there is no explicit
signaling mechanism for the FTC to detect. Therefore, the
current rule of reason analysis, which requires at least enough
evidence to produce an inference of an agreement between
buyers or sellers to raise prices in order to suggest unlawful
114
activity is occurring, may be wholly inadequate at policing
those B2B exchanges which provide transparent market
information to its participants.
The primary difficulty in policing potential price-fixing
agreements in the B2B industry, as elsewhere, will likely
involve cases lacking an express agreement. It can be very
difficult to distinguish between an implicit price-fixing
115
The highest
agreement and simple competitive behavior.
potential for abuse occurs in those B2B exchanges in which
participants have real-time access to each other’s bids and
116
prices.
Some proponents of B2B exchanges assert that these
marketplaces already have strong incentives to organize their
operations in such a way as to avoid anticompetitive
109. See id.
110. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
111. See id.
112. See Comments of the American Antitrust Institute Relating to Orbitz
and
the
D.O.T.’s
C.R.S.
Rulemaking,
14
(Sept.
18,
2000)
<http://www.antitrustinstitute.org>.
113. See Charles F. Rule, et al., B2B or Collusion, LEGAL TIMES 36 (April 3,
2000).
114. See supra notes 108-109 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 107-109 and accompanying text.
116. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
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117

information-sharing practices.
However true that may be,
the facts of the airline price-fixing case demonstrate that, given
the ability to engage in subtle price signaling measures,
118
unlawful anticompetitive behavior will sometimes occur.
Therefore, while a hands-off approach to regulation of B2B’s
may produce adequate results in most cases due to market
forces that require B2B’s to engage in fair practices in order to
119
attract members, it is likely that some abuses will occur.
Furthermore, the alleged case of spread-fixing on NASDAQ
provides evidence that price collusion may occur even in realtime markets where no information on future pricing can be
120
exchanged. It is paramount, therefore, that the FTC consider
new approaches to regulate information exchange on B2B
marketplaces.
The most commonly suggested solution to the problem of
price collusion consists of restrictions on the amount of
information that buyers and sellers are allowed to share on the
121
Generally, these restrictions involve creating a
exchange.
“vertical path” within the exchange, protected by firewalls
122
within the software driving the exchange. Vertical paths only
allow a purchaser to see the bids which it has made, and not
123
Likewise, a seller only sees the
the bids of other buyers.
prices that a buyer is willing to pay for its goods, and not the
117. See, e.g., Jasinowski, supra note 13 (asserting that B2B exchanges will
enhance rather than restrict competition, even without government
regulation); Edward Correia, Testimony to the FTC Workshop 502 (visited
April 9, 2001) <http://www.ftc.gov> (stating that “[w]hen rivals are putting
prices out for basically instantaneous transactions, I think it might be very
hard to imagine a very effective way to collude” because with real-time
transactions, there is no opportunity to signal future contingent prices to
competitors).
118. See Baker, supra note 97. Baker argues that additional evidence
shows that given the opportunity, price fixing will occur. See id. Baker cites
contemporary economic “game” theory which shows the plausibility of price
coordination among competitors, even in the absence of an agreement which
would render it unlawful under current antitrust laws. See id.
119. Likewise, while voluntary disclosure laws in the securities industry
may produce optimal results in many cases the well established evidence of
fraud in the securities markets prior to the enactment of disclosure laws
demonstrates that given the opportunity for abuse, some abuse will likely
occur. See supra note 64. See also Seligman, The Historical Need for a
Mandatory Corporate Disclosure System, 9 J. CORP. L. 1 (1983).
120. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
121. See, e.g., The Original Equipment Suppliers Association, supra note
58.
122. See id. at 5.
123. See id.
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124

prices at which other sellers are willing to sell.
In many cases, the buyers and sellers on a B2B exchange
already demand a certain degree of data confidentiality to
125
Such restrictions on
protect their proprietary information.
information sharing, however, tend to negate some of the
possible benefits of participation in a B2B exchange. Having
access to the identity of other buyers and sellers, as well as the
prices of purchased goods and their quantities, allows a
participant to get an idea of overall trends within the market.
The discernment of such trends can help an exchange
participant manage its inventory levels, reducing the chance of
it being caught with too much inventory or too little input
supplies, therefore smoothing out the overall business cycle in
126
Some exchange participants, therefore, are
the industry.
likely to desire access to some degree of information about
127
Even in those cases
other participants on the exchange.
where B2B participants do not desire information-sharing to
occur, a situation could arise in which a large B2B dominates a
given industry, and entities in the field may have no choice but
to join the exchange and play by its rules.
A first possible solution to protect against price collusion
while maintaining the ability to share a limited amount of
128
As
information is to require the anonymization of the data.
124. See id.
125. See Charles Phillips, Statements to the FTC Workshop stating that
my experience has been that the buyers and the
suppliers are definitely afraid of anybody seeing
anything else. They want these relationships to
remain private with a portion of the marketplace
public for people who want to do that, for suppliers
who want to discover new buyers, and they want to
publish a generic price for everyone to see. That
may be a different price than they’ve negotiated for a
supplier . . .
Id. Phillips also points out that the potential for price fixing through exchange
of information only exists in those B2B exchanges which utilize a real-time
pricing format. See id. at 300. In fact, however, many B2B exchanges only
offer a static pricing format in which buyers select items from posted catalogs.
See id. The catalogs may even be segmented such that a seller only allows
portions of the catalog to be available to purchasers who satisfy certain
criteria. See id.
126. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
127. See e.g., Comments of energyLeader.com to the FTC Workshop 11, 14
(June 2000) (stating that exchanges set up by energyLeader.com typically do
not allow buyers to learn about each others’ purchases, but may let sellers
have access to competitors’ prices).
128. See The Original Equipment Suppliers Association, supra note 58.
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long as the number of participants is large enough, information
concerning each bid for a good can be distributed to each
participant while making it difficult for any participant to
accurately attribute any specific transaction data to any
129
specific participant. Alternatively, the bid information can be
provided only in the aggregate. The total quantity of goods
purchased and the average price for a good over a given period
of time can be distributed, but not information pertaining to
130
any specific transaction.
The potential anticompetitive risks of information sharing
are enhanced when there is an asymmetry of information
131
A B2B exchange
among the participants on an exchange.
owned only by sellers or solely by buyers creates a situation in
which the owners, who necessarily have access to all
information being transferred on its exchange, have an
incentive to utilize their privileged position to the detriment of
132
non-owners.
Some B2B participants suggest that exchanges owned by
firms on the seller level rather than the buyer level are less
likely to raise antitrust concerns; a buyer-owned exchange may
feel more pressure to take advantage of inside information on
competitors, because one of the buyers’ primary aims is to
133
reduce the price at which it purchases goods from sellers.
From the perspective of the seller’s side, however, the primary
motivation in joining a B2B exchange is to develop a channel of
134
Thus, some
distributors and buyers to purchase its goods.
argue that a seller-led exchange would be “more in favor of
135
supporting an entire value chain" as opposed to favoring
sellers over buyers.
Buyer participants in B2B exchanges, however, often argue
that seller-owned exchanges pose the greatest risk of price
fixing activities. A seller-owned exchange could use its access
to exchange data to discover the purchasing needs of buyers in
136
A second solution,
advance and raise prices accordingly.
129. See id.
130. See supra note 119.
131. See The Original Equipment Suppliers Association, supra note 58.
132. See id. at 5.
133. See Dwayne Spradlin, Testimony to the FTC Workshop
(June 29, 2000).
134. See id.
135. Id.
136. See Kaushik Shridharani, Statement to the FTC Workshop 185 (June
29, 2000); Lori Mirek, Statement to the FTC Workshop 188-89, 200 (June 29,
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therefore, would be a regulation requiring an independent third
party to own B2B exchanges, which would minimize the danger
137
of owner favoritism.
Both of these solutions, however, may compromise the
formation of B2B exchanges and the level of efficiencies needed
to operate them. Numerous situations may exist in which a
seller-owned exchange or an independently owned exchange is
the most plausible or efficient way to organize a given B2B.
Consider, for example, that B2B’s require an enormous amount
138
Having a
of money and resources to commence operation.
B2B started and supported by players in the industry can
provide these resources, while an independent, third-party B2B
139
exchange may have to seek outside financing to operate.
Furthermore, in the recent market climate, in which Internet
start-ups are having serious difficulties obtaining venture
140
capital financing or completing initial public offerings (IPOs),
any regulation restricting who may have equity stakes in B2B
exchanges may prevent an exchange from being created. Such
a regulation would be especially inappropriate in the context of
a new and hyper-innovative industry such as B2B exchanges,
which are attempting to develop never before seen platforms,
and consequently require flexibility to determine which type of
business model is most efficient and effective. It would be
extremely difficult at this time for the FTC to interfere with an
industry for which the rules are still being written, and
effectively weigh the pros and cons of various B2B ownership
2000) (arguing that in supplier-owned exchanges,
traditional firewall mechanisms are likely to be particularly ineffective
because of the necessary integration between the supplier’s computer
information systems and that, of course, of the supplier-owned exchange’s
information systems. . . when suppliers run an exchange, they know each
other’s bids and prices on every trade instantly . . . one could, candidly, hardly
imagine a better mechanism . . . to affect . . . horizontal pricing agreements.).
137. See Comments of Currenex to the FTC Workshop 2 (June 2000)
(stating that “the independent, third-party exchange is the model that is most
likely to realize the efficiency-enhancing and pro-competitive potential of B2B
exchanges for consumers with the lowest likelihood of anti-competitive effects
such as collusion on fees or price.”).
138. See id.
139. See id.
140. See Jim Hopkins, Flow of Venture Capital Funds Slows to Trickle,
USA TODAY, (March 16, 2001) <http://www.usatoday.com/life/cyber/
invest/2001-03-16-venture.htm> (quoting the research firm Venture
Economics as stating that "the amount of money flowing into venture capital
funds fell 33% in the fourth quarter of 2000 compared with the third
quarter.").
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141

structures.
Nevertheless, the traditional antitrust analysis which the
FTC is currently employing in relation to B2B exchanges does
not adequately address the potential anticompetitive risks
involved in the sharing of information on these exchanges,
particularly those exchanges involving real-time pricing and
owned by a small group on the seller side. In light of the
dangers of placing restrictions on who may own and operate
B2B exchanges, a nuanced approach is called for which
balances the benefits of market transparency with its
associated antitrust concerns.
The FTC, therefore, should move to enact regulations
requiring the identity of all buyers and sellers in a B2B
employing real-time pricing to remain anonymous. In both the
airline price-fixing case and the NASDAQ spread-fixing case,
the defendants could determine the identities of all other
participants in the electronic market and so were allegedly able
to punish those who deviated from the implicit collusive
agreement. Requiring such anonymity, therefore, would make
it significantly more difficult for a price-fixing agreement to be
enforced.
Second, the FTC should enact a regulation prohibiting
owners of non-independent exchanges from utilizing
confidential information which it receives in their capacity as
owners in a way that is detrimental to other participants on the
exchange. A B2B could meet this requirement, for example, by
establishing firewalls between the owner’s computer systems
and those of the exchange. While responsible B2B’s will likely
already implement such procedures, this regulation will ensure
protection in any case in which a B2B is controlled by entities
which dominate in a given market, and could otherwise impose
anticompetitive information-sharing practices to the detriment
of other B2B participants.
These proposed regulations simply represent good faith
practices that should be relatively unburdensome to
implement, and help to provide needed protection without
imposing more substantive regulations which could cripple the
development of this already fragile industry.

141. See Arthur B. Scullery & W. William A. Woods, Comments to the FTC
Workshop 3 (visited April 9, 2001) <http://www.ftc.gov> (stating that “[i]n our
opinion, neither trade associations nor governmental bodies are sufficiently
flexible to cope with the rapid development of the B2B marketspace”).
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CONCLUSION
In light of the need for B2B’s to have flexibility in
designing the most efficient and effective marketplaces, it
would be unwise for the FTC to rush in and begin regulation of
the ownership structures of B2B’s at this time. This is
especially so since the FTC has little precedent to rely on in
establishing what is and is not anti-competitive behavior in the
B2B world. Since the types of risks found in the B2B world are
similar to those that are found in other joint collaborations
between competitors, the FTC’s Collaborator Guidelines may
ultimately serve as an effective starting point for dealing with
B2B’s. Evidence suggests, however, that current antitrust laws
cannot adequately address the anticompetitive risks which may
arise from the sharing of real-time pricing information between
buyers and sellers on a B2B exchange. Hence, the FTC should
encourage B2B exchanges to consider such approaches as
establishing independent boards to establish admission
standards to the exchange, and anonymizing all customer
identity data in exchanges involving real-time pricing of goods,
to reduce the risks of tacit price coordination which may be
nearly impossible to prove otherwise. It is important in any
case, however, that the FTC wait for the “dust to settle,” so to
speak, before embarking on any major, additional regulation of
the B2B’s which could discourage innovation and eliminate the
promised benefits of these exchanges before they even have the
opportunity to be recognized. Fortunately, the FTC seems to be
142
aware of its present limitations, and is proceeding cautiously.
Hopefully, the FTC will be able to develop an approach in due
time which appropriately balances the risks and opportunities
of these remarkable entities.

142. See, e.g., FTC Commissioner Orson Swindle, Remarks on “Antitrust in
the Emerging B2B Marketplace,” delivered to the Forum for Trust in Online
Trade, Princeton Club, (July 19, 2000) (stating that “we must be certain that
any actions the FTC takes in the B2B and E-commerce world are necessary
and rational. We must get this right; otherwise we could do terrible harm . . .
the government is not knowledgeable enough to begin regulating. We must
look before we leap and consider the potential unintended consequences . . .”);
FTC Public Notice (Sept. 11, 2000) (stating that the FTC had closed its
investigation of potential antitrust violations on the part of the Covisint B2B
exchange, stating that, “because Covisint is in the early stages of its
development . . . it is not yet operational . . .” The FTC could not say whether
implementation of the B2B would cause competitive concerns).

